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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellee Frank Vincent Family Ranch, LC ("Vincent") agrees with the statement 
of jurisdiction contained in the Brief of Appellants Delta Canal Company; Melville 
Irrigation Company; Abraham Irrigation Company; Deseret Irrigation Company; and 
Central Utah Water Company (collectively, "DMADC"). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
DMADC presents numerous issues for review on appeal. Vincent disagrees with 
some unfounded assumptions made in DMADC s statement of the issues presented for 
review, and will address those assumptions herein. However, Vincent generally agrees 
with the standard of review set forth by DMADC and agrees that the issues were 
preserved below. 
STATUTES OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE 
The 2002 and 2007 versions of Utah Code Annotated section 73-1-4 are of central 
importance to this appeal. Copies of these authorities are included in the Addendum to 
this Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
This case involves the interpretation of the partial forfeiture language first made a 
part of Utah Code Annotated section 73-1-4 in 2002. DMADC filed this lawsuit seeking 
an order of partial forfeiture relating to a portion of Vincent's water right. DMADC 
claimed that Vincent had failed to put its full water right to beneficial use for a 
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continuous period of five years and that the unused portion was forfeited in favor of 
downstream users, including DMADC. 
DMADC misapprehends both the law of forfeiture and the way Vincent has 
managed the water represented by its water right. That right is not subject to forfeiture 
for non-use during the period since enactment of the 2002 statute, nor was it under 
common law prior to the legislature's enactment of the statute. Section 73-1-4, and the 
common law prior to that, expressly exempt a water right from forfeiture where the 
source fails to yield sufficient water to satisfy the right. DMADC freely acknowledges 
that, in the event river flows are not sufficient to satisfy all water rights, available river 
flows are "prorated in proportion to the respective amount each user . . . is entitled to 
use." (DMADC Br. at xx (quotation marks omitted).) It was demonstrated below, as a 
matter of law, that the Sevier River did not produce sufficient water to satisfy all water 
rights in each of the last twenty years. Accordingly, Vincent's water right is exempt from 
a claim of partial forfeiture during that period. Clearly, DMADC did not plead or prove 
any basis for Vincent to have taken the full amount of water described in its right in a 
time of drought, ahead of others of equal or superior priority. 
What water Vincent does receive from the Sevier River is put to beneficial use. 
Unlike DMADC, Vincent's water right contains no carry-over storage component and 
Vincent has no meaningful ability to supplement its river right from wells or other 
sources. Vincent must anticipate the summer's water supply when it plants in the spring 
and hope that nature will provide sufficient to raise an economically viable crop. This is 
necessarily an inexact science, but Vincent has been successful in making these 
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prognostications. Except on a few rare occasions when it began operations on this farm, 
Vincent has been able to use all of the water available to it from the river and, when 
additional water under its right has become available, Vincent has been able to 
beneficially use that water on its more marginally productive fields and to enhance 
habitat.1 Vincent's beneficial use of substantially all of the water available to it, and any 
nonuse caused by the failure of the Sevier River to produce sufficient water, preclude 
forfeiture of a portion of the water right. 
II. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
DMADC initiated this action on May 1, 2008, by filing a Complaint with the 
Fourth District Court in Millard County. (R. at 1-17.) DMADC alleged that Vincent 
owned Water Right No. 68-3002, which right arose pursuant to a judicial decree entered 
on November 30, 1936, in Case No. 843, Richlands Irrigation Co. v. West View 
Irrigation Co. et al. (the "Cox Decree"). (R. at 3.) DMADC sought forfeiture or 
abandonment of a portion of Vincent's water right, claiming Vincent failed to put the 
entire right to beneficial use. (R. at 4-7.) 
Vincent moved for summary judgment on DMADC s claims because the 
undisputed facts established that Vincent had consistently used all of the water that was 
available to it from the Sevier River. (R. at 104-105, 110-113.) Vincent at times had 
l DMADC, both in its brief on appeal and in its arguments below, confuses irrigation 
with cultivation, using the terms interchangeably as if they had the same meaning and 
import. They do not, at least in this case. While Vincent may have regularly cultivated 
some 900 acres of land based on the flows it could reasonably anticipate from the Sevier 
River, it has regularly used additional water when available to irrigate additional, non-
cultivated land up to its 1,051.5 acre right to improve habitat for cattle grazing and its 
commercial bird operation. 
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failed to irrigate the full acreage specified under Water Right No. 68-3002, but only 
because the Sevier River failed to provide enough water to satisfy Vincent's right. (R. at 
110-113.) DMADC's claims failed as a matter of law because Vincent's nonuse was due 
to the natural unavailability in the source of the full amount of its water right. (R. at 114-
18.) 
DMADC filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, also claiming that no 
material fact was undisputed. (R. at 229.) DMADC argued that Vincent could not have 
used the full water right, which entitled Vincent to irrigate 1,051.5 acres, because Vincent 
had cultivated only 837 acres of farmland. (R. at 245.) DMADC based its arguments in 
part on its contention that the irrigation duty applicable to Vincent's property was four 
acre feet per acre. (R. at 248.) DMADC asked the district court to take judicial notice of 
the Utah Division of Water Rights website that listed a duty of four acre feet per acre. 
(R. at 248.) DMADC also focused on Vincent's predecessor-in-interest, arguing that it 
similarly failed to use, and forfeited, a portion of the water right during the period before 
the statute provided for partial forfeiture. (R. at 248-50.) Finally, DMADC claimed that 
Vincent's use of irrigation water to support its commercial bird hunting operation and for 
cattle grazing, rather than on cultivated fields, was not a beneficial use. (R. at 243-44.) 
The evidence submitted by DMADC confirmed, however, that Vincent and its 
predecessor in interest had used substantially all of the water available during the relevant 
time period. (R. at 351-61.) DMADC's evidence confirmed that there were no disputed 
issues of material fact regarding the amount of water available to Vincent and its 
predecessor. (R. at 357-58.) In fact, the river provided 100% of the amount of water 
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decreed for its users three times in the 30 years prior to the hearing. (R. at 206.) Further, 
Utah law did not provide for partial forfeiture of a water right until 2002. (R. at 358-60.) 
Vincent also argued that the beneficial use of water is not limited to application of the 
water on cultivated land. (R. at 360.) Vincent beneficially used the water to irrigate the 
vegetation necessary to operate its commercial bird hunting operation and for winter 
cattle grazing. (R. at 360.) Vincent also demonstrated that the Proposed Determination , 
confirmed by the Cox Decree, allocated 5,000 acre feet of water to irrigate Vincent's 
1,051.5 acres of land. That Decree which has not been altered or amended in this respect, 
adjudicated the amount (or duty) of water Vincent is entitled to use on its farm. (R. at 
356-57. See also R. at 125.) 
On December 9, 2010, DM ADC filed a Request to Submit for Decision and 
Request for Hearing, certifying pursuant to Rule 7(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure that briefing was complete and inviting the district court to rule on the 
summary judgment motions. (R. at 395-96.) The district court held a hearing on 
March 30, 2011, at which the parties presented oral argument. (R. at 400, 763.) On 
May 26, 2011, and before the district court had ruled on the summary judgment motions, 
DMADC filed a Motion for Leave to Supplement Summary Judgment Record, 
attempting to offer an alternative argument based on information already before the 
district court. (R. at 401.) 
The district court issued a Memorandum Decision on Cross Motions for Summary 
Judgment on June 6, 2011, granting in part and denying in part Vincent's motion and 
denying DMADC s motion. (R. at 414-421.) The district court held there was no dispute 
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that the Sevier River failed periodically to yield sufficient water to satisfy Vincent's 
water right. (R. at 417.) The court based its holding on the undisputed river flow records 
submitted by both parties establishing that Vincent used all water available to it in 2002 
and 2007. (R. at 417-18.) "Due to [Vincent's] use of all available water in 2002 and in 
2007, when considering all possible five year blocks between 1999 and 2009, there is no 
five year period in which [Vincent] has not used all available water at least one year out 
of each five year period." (R. at 418.) The district court concluded that although Vincent 
"was entitled to receive a full duty water right of 4,206 acre feet," Vincent "can not lose 
by forfeiture water which it did not receive due to physical conditions outside of its 
control including over-subscription of the water supply." (R. at 417.) 
The district court denied DMADC's motion on the same grounds. (R. at 420-21.) 
Even if DMADC were correct that Vincent had not cultivated enough land to receive the 
full amount of its water right, there was no dispute that Vincent had not received 
sufficient water, for reasons outside of Vincent's control, to irrigate 1,051.5 acres. (R. at 
420.) The district court's decision was based in part on DMADC's own "calculations of 
land cultivated and irrigated, and the amount of water needed to water that land." (R. at 
420.) The court also considered and rejected DMADC's "flawed" supplemental 
argument because it assumed Vincent could receive its full water right "without regard to 
the limitations placed on its water rights by virtue of the over subscription of the water 
supply." (R. at 417.) It was undisputed that Vincent put the majority of its water to 
beneficial use on its cultivated land. (R. at 419.) The district court determined that there 
was a factual dispute, however, regarding the amount of water Vincent used to irrigate 
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the wildlife habitat used for its commercial hunting operation and cattle grazing and 
whether such use was beneficial. (R. at 419.) 
On July 20, 2011, DM ADC moved the district court to reconsider its summary 
judgment ruling. (R. at 438-439.) DMADC did not present new evidence or new legal 
grounds for its argument. Rather, DMADC suggested that the district court must not 
have fully considered certain facts and attempted to reargue facts and issues previously 
presented to the district court. (See R. at 442.) For example, DMADC argued that 
Vincent had adopted conflicting positions regarding its irrigation and that the district 
court failed to consider water available to Vincent during the pre-irrigation season. (R. at 
446-451.) But, Vincent consistently claimed to irrigate up to 1,051.5 acres of land as 
water is available from the Sevier River. (R. at 574.) Additionally, while Vincent is 
allowed to take water if it can be put to beneficial use in the pre-irrigation season, it is not 
obligated to take it and run it to waste just to satisfy DMADC's calculations. In most 
years, Vincent was unable to receive or use the pre-irrigation water and Vincent had no 
storage right for the pre-irrigation water. (R. at 575-77.) DMADC's new arguments did 
not alter the fact that the Sevier River is over-appropriated and generally has not 
delivered enough water to satisfy Vincent's water right. (R. at 577.) 
On December 7, 2011, the district court issued a Memorandum Decision on 
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of Partial Summary Judgment, refusing to disturb 
its original ruling. (R. at 683-87.) The district court observed that it had erred in relying 
upon DMADC's representation that the duty of Vincent's water right was 4,206 acre feet, 
and should have instead relied on the Cox Decree and the Proposed Determination, which 
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confirmed 5,000 acre feet as the measure of Water Right No. 68-3002. (R. at 685-86.) 
The district court further held that, although DMADC was essentially rearguing facts and 
issues already before the court, even considering those arguments the original ruling was 
not affected because DMADC still failed to establish that the source yielded sufficient 
water over time to satisfy Vincent's right. (R. at 686-87.) 
Vincent prepared a proposed order on the district court's ruling denying 
DMADCs Motion for Reconsideration. (See R. at 687.) DMADC objected to the 
proposed order and requested once again that the court revisit its prior rulings. (R. at 
689-96.) DMADC claimed that the district court failed to address the issue of water use 
by Vincent's predecessor and erred in relying on the Proposed Determination. (R. at 691-
93.) Once more, DMADC took issue with the district court's forfeiture analysis and 
claimed its abandonment claim remained pending for trial. (R. at 694-96.) 
The district court heard oral argument on DMADC's Objections to Proposed 
Order and/or Request for Clarification of Orders on March 28, 2012. (R. at 734, 765.) 
On April 2, 2012, the district court issued a Memorandum Decision on DMADC s 
objections and request for clarification. (R. at 735-39.) Therein, the court patiently 
reiterated and confirmed its prior rulings. The court held that the relevant time period for 
DMADC's claims was 1988 through 2008 and that the statute on which DMADC relied 
was amended in 2002. (R. at 736.) The court confirmed that the amendment was 
substantive and could not be applied retroactively. (R. at 736. See also R. at 416.) Thus, 
the court relied on the common law for the period between 1988 and 2002, and on the 
statute for the period between 2002 and 2008. (R. at 736.) 
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Based on the undisputed evidence, the court held that the Sevier River failed to 
yield sufficient water to satisfy Vincent's right in any year between 2002 and 2008, and 
Vincent was exempt from the statute as a matter of law. (R. at 737.) The court stated 
that "[b]oth forfeiture and abandonment were brought [by DMADC] pursuant to Section 
73-1-4 of the Utah Code. Therefore, after the statutory exemption was in place, 
[DMADC is] precluded from claiming either a partial forfeiture, or partial abandonment." 
(R. at 737.) The district court also restated its ruling regarding partial forfeiture or 
abandonment prior to 2002 and held that DMADC, as a matter of law, had "failed to 
provide a legal basis to establish that partial forfeiture or abandonment is an available 
remedy under the statutes of the state prior to 2002, or that it has been recognized as a 
common law cause of action." (R. at 737-38.) 
The district court next clarified that its summary judgment analysis had addressed 
the use of Water Right No. 68-3002 between the relevant time period of 1988 through 
2008, regardless of who owned the right. (R. at 738.) Clearly, the court's prior statement 
that the Sevier River failed to "yield sufficient water to satisfy the water right for 
defendant and its predecessor" (see R. at 417) included the period in which Vincent's 
predecessor owned the water right and used water. (R. at 738.) The district court also 
rejected DMADC s claim that Vincent improperly relied on the Proposed Determination 
to the Cox Decree where: DMADC failed to raise a timely objection; DMADC failed to 
present any reliable evidence itself; and where DMADC itself relied upon the Proposed 
Determination as a basis for determining the attributes of the water right. (R. at 739.) 
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The parties agreed that no issues remained to be tried and that final judgment 
should enter. (R. at 753.) The district court entered a Final Order and Judgment on 
May 7, 2012, (R. at 752-57), and this appeal followed. 
III. Statement of Facts 
1. The Cox Decree, adjudicating the rights to the waters of the Sevier River, 
was issued on November 30, 1936, in Richlands Irrigation Co. v. West View Irrigation 
Co. et aU Case No. 843. (R. at 3, 165-67, 254-63.) 
2. Pursuant to the Cox Decree, the Samuel Mclntyre Investment Company 
("Mclntyre") was awarded Water Right No. 68-3002. (R. at 168-70, 258-61.) 
3. In 1998, Vincent purchased the Mclntyre ranch and its water rights, 
including Water Right No. 68-3002. (R. at 136-37, 142.) 
4. Water Right No. 68-3002 allows for the diversion of 22.0 cfs of water from 
the Sevier River. (R. at 3, 12-14. See also R. at 168-70, 258, 260.) 
5. The Cox Decree was based in part on the Proposed Determination 
previously prepared by the Utah State Engineer, the so-called "Bacon's Bible." (R. at 
166,255.) 
6. The Proposed Determination allows for the irrigation of 1,051.5 acres of 
land with 5,000 acre feet of water. (R. at 3, 16, 168-70, 685-87. See also R. at 155-56, 
420,673-75.) 
7. There was no timely objection to Water Right No. 68-3002 as set forth in 
the Proposed Determination and that relevant portion of the Proposed Determination was 
confirmed and adopted in the Cox Decree. (See R. at 166-70, 255-60.) 
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8. The Cox Decree was a final judicial decree from which no appeal was 
taken. (R. at 420-21.) No party to this action contended that the Cox Decree has been 
altered or amended since it was entered by the District Court in 1936. 
9. While the Cox Decree allocates the right to use water to irrigate 1,051.5 
acres to Water Right No. 68-3002, it does not guarantee that sufficient water will be 
made available to the user. The river is over-appropriated. (See R. at 168-70, 258-61, 
417.) 
10. The amount of water allocated to each user on the Sevier River is carefully 
controlled and determined by the Sevier River Commissioner using a complex 
accounting system to determine what percentage of their water rights the river users will 
be allowed to divert each year. (R. at 146, 157, 417, 589, 684.) 
11. The Sevier River usually does not produce sufficient water to fulfill 100% 
of the primary water rights, and diversions to the water users are routinely reduced 
commensurate with the reduced river flows. (R. at 146, 157, 366, 417, 589, 684. See 
also R. at 195-206, 369-82, 527-51.) 
12. Records of the Sevier River Commissioner, on which both parties relied, 
show that the Sevier River has produced sufficient water to supply all of Water Right No. 
68-3002 in only three years since 1935. (R. at 206, 508. (See also R. at 195-206, 371-81, 
528-60.) 
13. Although their water deliveries were reduced, Vincent and its predecessor 
used substantially all of the water available to them between 1988 and 2008 (the twenty-
year period prior to the filing of DMADC's Complaint). Between 1987 and 1998, 
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Mclntyre "used all of the water [it] could on the approximately 830 cultivated acres" and 
"never had too much water or more water than [it] could use on the 830 cultivated acres." 
(R. at 344. See also R. at 366, 417, 738, 743-44.) 
14. With the minor exception of the first years of operation as it learned the 
Sevier River allocation and accounting system, Vincent has likewise placed all of the 
water allocated to Water Right 68-3002 by the Sevier River Commissioner to beneficial 
use each year that Vincent has owned the property. (R. at 129 (lines 1-4), 139-40, 146-
49, 157, 159, 191, 226, 418, 686-87, 743-44.) 
15. During the pre-irrigation season (March 1 through April 15), Vincent has a 
right to divert a direct flow of the Sevier River, but the pre-April 15 flows do not include 
any storage component. If unused, the pre-April 15 flows cannot be claimed as storage 
credits for use later in the irrigation seasons. (R. at 123, 582-83, 588.) 
16. Very few water users can put water to beneficial use during the pre-
irrigation season for a number of reasons. There is generally little water available in the 
Sevier River during that time period. Additionally, the ground is often covered by snow 
or remains too wet from winter precipitation to clear ditches and prepare fields. The wet 
fields also cannot accept irrigation water and attempting such early irrigation can damage 
crops. Only one water user on the lower Sevier River regularly diverts and uses water 
during the pre-irrigation season. (R. at 583-84, 588.) 
17. Between April 16 and October 1 of each year, Vincent may elect not to 
divert the full amount of water available to it and store a portion for use later in the 
irrigation season when primary flows of the Sevier River are low. The credits Vincent 
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may accrue in storage are determined by Vincent's prorated right to divert water based 
upon the flow of the river. (R. at 123, 588, 590. See also, e.g., R. at 195-205.) 
18. Vincent's storage credits do not carry over year to year and Vincent has no 
supplemental well or other water rights it can use to irrigate. Vincent receives only the 
water provided in the Sevier River by nature each year. (See R. at 137-40, 168-70, 258-
61,588,590.) 
19. Because the Sevier River usually does not provide 100% of the flows 
allocated by the Cox Decree and Vincent's diversions are cut back, Vincent must assess 
the potential water deliveries it will receive in any given year and allocate the water to its 
most profitable and actively irrigated lands. (R. at 138-40, 148, 157-59.) 
20. Vincent can safely assume that it will be able to irrigate approximately 900 
acres each year to a full irrigation duty and produce a mature and economically viable 
crop with the water that is likely to be available to it throughout the irrigation season. 
(R. at 137-38, 585.) 
21. Vincent uses additional water, when made available by the River 
Commissioner, to irrigate its more marginally productive fields, typically at less than a 
full irrigation duty. (R. at 138, 147-48, 158-59.) 
22. Any remaining water, including the run-off from the irrigated fields, is 
diverted to irrigate other areas of the ranch used for winter cattle pasture and in the 
state-licensed commercial bird operation run by Vincent. (R. at 138-39, 147-48, 158-59, 
360-61.) 
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23. Vincent has the land and the ability to devote acreage to cultivation up to its 
allowed 1,051.5 acres if it knew in advance of each year that the Sevier River would 
produce 100% of its flow. But since this has not been the case, Vincent prudently 
allocates the full amount of water made available by the Sevier River Commissioner first 
to its most profitable lands, and then for irrigation of more marginal lands including its 
bird habitat areas. (R. at 139, 148, 159.) 
24. In August 2006, Vincent filed a change application with the Utah State 
Engineer to more efficiently use the water made available from the river. Vincent sought 
to change the place of use for some of its water from steep and less productive ground to 
an area with better soils where an efficient pivot irrigation system would be installed. 
(R. at 219-221.) 
25. DMADC protested the application. {See R. at 225-28.) 
26. The State Engineer approved Vincent's change application, specifically 
noting, based upon available data (including protestants' maps and aerial photos), that "it 
appears that [Vincent] has consistently diverted the water available under this water right 
and irrigated nearly all of the acreage." (R. at 226.) 
27. DMADC appealed the State Engineer's approval of the Vincent change 
application and also filed this action, seeking an order declaring a partial forfeiture of 
Vincent's water right. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court properly granted Vincent summary judgment on DMADC s 
claims because the failure of the Sevier River to deliver full flows made Vincent's water 
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right statutorily exempt from forfeiture. DMADC had sought forfeiture of a portion of 
Vincent's water right, alleging that Vincent failed to place a portion of its water to 
beneficial use for a period of five years. The Utah forfeiture statute, section 73-1-4, 
however, does not apply to "those periods of time when a surface water source fails to 
yield sufficient water to satisfy the water right." The undisputed evidence, including the 
records submitted by DMADC, demonstrated that the Sevier River failed to yield 
sufficient water to satisfy Vincent's water right during the relevant time period. 
The district court found that, prior to the adoption of the partial forfeiture statute in 
2002, Utah law did not provide for the partial forfeiture of a water right. DMADC and 
the Utah State Engineer argue that partial forfeiture has always been a feature of Utah 
water law but, in more than 100 years of water cases decided in the second driest state in 
the nation, they could not cite a single case holding that a water right had been partially 
forfeited or abandoned. Indeed, this Court recognized in 1991 that, while partial 
forfeiture may be consistent with public policy, the issue was not addressed in the statutes 
and had never been directly presented to the Court. As if in response to that invitation, 
the legislature amended Utah Code Annotated section 73-1-4 in 2002 to provide for 
partial forfeiture and abandonment for unused portions of water rights. DMADC did not 
offer any evidence to suggest that the 2002 amendment, which the district court here 
found to be substantive, was intended by the legislature to be remedial or otherwise 
retroactive in effect. 
Although the district court found that Utah law did not provide for partial 
forfeiture prior to 2002, it nevertheless analyzed the undisputed evidence offered in 
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support of the opposing motions for summary judgment. It found, each of the several 
times DMADC asked the court to look at it, that the court had reviewed the Sevier River 
data provided by the parties for the years after 1988, and that there was no partial 
forfeiture or abandonment of the water right, either by Vincent or by its predecessor. 
The failure of the Sevier River to provide the full amount of water specified in 
Vincent's water right requires Vincent to irrigate less than all of its acreage to its full 
duty. Vincent does not have carry-over storage associated with its water right or 
supplemental well rights; it receives only that water supplied by nature each year. 
Vincent has been prudent in its use of water that is available to grow crops to full 
maturity, grow feed for its livestock and to support its commercial bird hunting operation. 
DMADC's arguments were based on incorrect or immaterial data. The district court 
correctly determined that Vincent's beneficial use of all of the water available to it 
precluded DMADC s partial forfeiture and abandonment claims. 
ARGUMENT 
I. VINCENT'S WATER RIGHT WAS EXEMPT FROM PARTIAL 
FORFEITURE BECAUSE THE SEVIER RIVER HAS FAILED TO 
PRODUCE SUFFICIENT WATER TO SATISFY THE RIGHT 
DMADC argues that the district court erred by refusing its request for partial 
forfeiture of Vincent's water right and applying the so-called "physical causes defense." 
Although DMADC sought partial forfeiture of Water Right No. 68-3002 under section 
73-1-4 of the Utah Code, (R. at 4-7), DMADC ignores the plain language of that statute. 
It expressly provides, and the district court correctly held, that Vincent's water right is 
exempt from partial forfeiture, because the undisputed facts demonstrate that at all 
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relevant times the Sevier River failed to produce sufficient water to satisfy Vincent's 
right. Indeed, DMADC admits that "it was undisputed that the river typically did not 
match the Cox Decree amounts " (DMADC Br. at 18.) That same evidence 
confirms that Vincent has beneficially used substantially all of the water provided to it 
under the water right and is, on that additional ground, exempt from forfeiture. 
A. Section 73-1-4 Expressly Exempts Vincent's Water Right from 
Forfeiture. 
In 2002, the Utah Legislature amended the Utah forfeiture statute to allow for the 
partial forfeiture of a water right and recognized that a consistent, long-term failure to use 
a portion of a water right may subject the user to forfeiture of that portion. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 73-1-4 (2002). DMADC filed its Complaint under the 2007 version of 
section 73-1-4, which provides that one who "abandons or ceases to use all or a portion 
of a water right for a period of five years" forfeits the water right or the unused portion of 
that water right. Utah Code Ann. § 73-l-4(3)(a) (2007).2 (See alsoR. at 1-8.) A judicial 
action seeking forfeiture of a water right must be initiated "within 15 years from the end 
of the latest period of nonuse of at least five years." Utah Code Ann. § 73-l-4(c)(i) 
(2007). Thus, the relevant time-period in this case was the twenty-year period (five years 
plus fifteen years) prior to the filing of DMADCs Complaint in 2008. 
Subsection (3)(a) was amended in 2008 to extend the nonuse period to seven years. The 
parties and district court proceeded under the pre-2008 version of the statute because the 
relevant time period occurred and DMADC s Complaint was filed prior to the effective 
date of the amendment (see R. at 1-8, 418). DMADC did not argue that the 2008 
amendment applied retroactively. 
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Because water rights are a type of property right, see Randolph Land & Livestock 
Co. v. United States, 271 P.2d 846, 848 (Utah 1954), stripping them from an owner 
through forfeiture is a harsh remedy. As such, the Legislature determined that one 
random year of nonuse would not work to forfeit an owner's right. Rather, nonuse must 
occur over a much longer period of time—a five year cycle in this case.3 The Court 
requires "strict adherence to the statutory sanctions requiring forfeiture for the nonuse of 
a water right" and "that a departure from this principle of strict adherence is justified only 
in a 'rare and highly equitable case.'" Eskelsen v. Town of Perry, 819 P.2d 770, 776 
(Utah 1991) (quoting Baugh v. Criddle, 431 P.2d 790, 791-92 (Utah 1967)). 
Additionally, all appropriation states have adopted exemptions to forfeiture to 
prevent the "unfairness in loss of a water right through nonuse where conditions beyond 
the control of the owner of such right prevent use." See, e.g., Chavez v. Gutierrez, 213 
P.2d 597, 600 (N.M. 1950). Section 73-1-4 expressly exempts a water user from 
forfeiture where the water source does not provide sufficient water to satisfy the right: 
"The provisions of this section shall not apply: (i) to those periods of time when a 
surface water source fails to yield sufficient water to satisfy the water right." Utah 
Code Ann. § 73-l-4(3)(f)(i) (emphasis added). 
In construing statutes similar to this, the courts have uniformly held that 
forfeiture will not operate in those cases where the failure to use is the 
result of physical causes beyond the control of the appropriator such as 
floods which destroy his dams and ditches, draughts, etc., where the 
appropriator is ready and willing to divert the water when it is naturally 
available. 
3 As noted, the nonuse period has since been extended to grant water right owners even 
more protection. 
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Rocky Ford Irrigation Co. v. Kents Lake Reservoir Co., 135 P.2d 108, 111 (Utah 1943) 
(citing Morris v. Bean, 146 F. 423 (D. Mont. 1906), aff'd, 159 F. 651 (1908) & 221 U.S. 
485 (1911); Ramsay v. Gottsche, 69 P.2d 535 (Wyo. 1937); Horse Creek Conservation 
Dist. v. Lincoln Land Co., 92 P.2d 572 (Wyo. 1939); N.M. Prods. Co. v. N.M. Power Co., 
11 P.2d 634 (N.M. 1937); In re Manse Spring and its Tributaries, 108 P.2d 311 (Nev. 
1940); Hutchings, Selected Problems in the Law of Water Rights in the West, at 396). 
The records submitted to the district court by the parties, including those 
submitted by DMADC, showed that the Sevier River has consistently failed to yield 
sufficient water to satisfy all decreed water rights.4 As DMADC acknowledges, in that 
situation, the available flows are prorated in proportion to the rights. (DMADC Br. at 
xx.) In considering the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court 
first examined water deliveries to Vincent during the possible five year periods between 
2002 (the amendment of section 73-1-4 creating partial forfeiture) and 2008 (the filing 
4 Both parties relied on data supplied by the Sevier River Commissioner, summarized at 
R. 206, a copy of which is attached as Addendum C. The Court should note that the 22 
cfs flow rate for Vincent's right to divert from the Sevier River may be measured at the 
point of diversion, but its 5,000 acre foot right of use is measured at the place of use, the 
Vincent farm. This is significant because Vincent's point of diversion is seven miles up-
canal from its place of use. {See R. at 182-83.) DMADC's calculations simply based on 
diversion rates are all undermined by its failure to address the significant conveyance loss 
as water travels through a seven mile open, dirt-lined canal. Those losses may be as 
much as 30%. DMADC's duty argument (duty is traditionally measured at the place of 
use, rather than the point of diversion) is also undercut by its failure to account for 
transmission losses. 
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of DMADC's Complaint). (R. at 417-18.)5 The records showed that the Sevier River did 
not produce sufficient water between 2002 and 2008 to fulfill all water rights, including 
that belonging to Vincent. (R. at 206, 417-18, 508. See also R. at 146, 157, 198-204, 
554-560.) The reduced river flows prevented Vincent from irrigating the full 1,051.5 
acres allowed for in the Cox Decree. Yet, except for a few rare occasions, Vincent 
beneficially used all of the water available to it by the river and the river commissioner. 
That use is sufficient under our statutes. Farming, especially in a desert environment, is a 
risky and unpredictable venture. It is perhaps in recognition of that fact that the 
legislature does not require a precise accounting, but rather protects water rights from 
forfeiture if "substantially all" of the right is put to beneficial use. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 73-l-4(2)(e)(vi) (2012). 
The reduced amounts of water available for diversion from the Sevier River 
require that Vincent anticipate and plan its water use each year to make the most 
reasonable use of the amount of water that is scheduled to be delivered, and then to 
beneficially use any additional water it may receive on its more marginal lands. Each 
year, Vincent assess the amount of its water right it is likely to receive from the Sevier 
River, and then plan accordingly to maximize the beneficial and economical use of that 
5 The parties submitted evidence of and the district court, in fact, examined earlier water 
deliveries to Vincent and its predecessor. (R. at 417, 738.) As discussed in more detail 
below, the district court held that because the 2002 amendment was a substantive change 
to the law, it could not be applied retroactively and the common law governed DMADC's 
claim of forfeiture prior to 2002. (R. at 415-16, 736.) The district court found no basis 
for partial forfeiture either before or after the 2002 amendment. 
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water.6 Vincent uses every drop of water it can to irrigate cultivated acreage. At the time 
the district court considered the competing motions herein, Vincent had approximately 
897 acres of land prepared for full crop cultivation based upon the water deliveries from 
the river and the expected future deliveries. Vincent was also prepared to irrigate an 
additional 162 acres if the irrigation water was available. 
Vincent was often required to irrigate its more marginal fields at less than a full 
irrigation duty, growing pasture for fall and winter livestock grazing, to maximize the 
benefit it received from the reduced water deliveries. In addition to its farming 
operations, Vincent uses a portion of the ranch to graze cattle and for a commercial bird 
hunting operation which requires denser vegetation than will grow with the natural 
precipitation in the area. Vincent's irrigation of the natural vegetation was the only way 
to maintain the denser habitat necessary for the cattle and for the birds raised in 
connection with its hunting operation. 
Although Vincent has usually been able to cultivate and irrigate less than 80% of 
its land as a result of the reduced water deliveries, Vincent has been efficient in its use of 
the water and has usually been able to irrigate a greater percentage of its land than the 
amount of water made available to it would suggest. Vincent continued that effort to 
maximize the beneficial use of its water right in 2006 by filing a change application with 
6 The law does not require Vincent to spread the reduced amounts of water it receives 
each year over all of its 1,051.5 permitted acres in order to prevent forfeiture, as DMADC 
suggests. In a year where, for example, the river is anticipated to produce 60% of the 
amount of water needed to satisfy the water rights, it makes sense for a farmer like 
Vincent to plant and irrigate only 60% of its fields. It would be neither economical nor 
beneficial in such a year for Vincent to be required to plant all of its permitted acreage, 
knowing it would not then have sufficient water to bring any of its crops to maturity. 
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the Utah State Engineer. Vincent sought to move the place of use of some of its water to 
more profitable lands. In approving Vincent's application, the State Engineer stated that 
"it appears that [Vincent] has consistently diverted the water available under this water 
right and irrigated nearly all of the acreage." (R. at 226.) 
DMADC argued that the facts concerning partial forfeiture were undisputed and 
moved for summary judgment on the partial forfeiture claim. Based on the undisputed 
reports submitted and relied upon by both parties (R. at 417-18), the district court found 
that in 2007, Vincent used "all water made available to it, and had zero credit a[t] the end 
of the year." (R. at 418.) Similarly, in 2002, Vincent used all but 9.6 acre feet made 
available to it, which the court determined was less than 0.3% of the total water allocated 
to Vincent—a de minimus amount. (R. at 418.) Vincent had beneficially used 100% of 
the water available to it in 2007, and 99.7% of the water available in 2002. (R. at 418.)7 
Accordingly, DMADC failed to, and cannot, establish any consecutive five year period 
between 2002 and 2008 in which Vincent had received but failed to use a material 
portion of its water right. 
B. DMADC's Other Post-2002 Arguments are Unavailing. 
Having received an unfavorable decision, DMADC initiated a series of attempts to 
reargue its position to the district court, based on facts already presented to and 
7 These calculations were based on the incorrect 4 acre foot per acre duty advocated by 
DMADC. (See R. at 685-66.) 
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considered by the court. (See R. at 423-31, 569-78, 720-23.)* DMADC did not offer any 
new evidence or legal theories (or even a valid excuse for its failure to advance timely 
arguments), instead focusing on issues that were largely immaterial to the court's 
decision. DMADC raises the same arguments on appeal, but they are still unavailing 
because, according to section 73-1-4, Vincent's use of all the water provided by the 
source exempts its right from forfeiture. DMADC recognizes the rules of statutory 
construction (DMADC Br. at 8), but ignores the clear import of the exemption contained 
in section 73-1-4. Moreover, the district court considered DMADC s additional 
arguments, even though it was not required to do so, and came to the same result. (R. at 
735-39,752-57.) 
i. Beneficial Use is Not Limited to Application of Water on 
Cultivated Land. 
DMADC claims, for example, that Vincent failed to cultivate more than 837 acres 
and, consequently, could not have fully used the water right which allows for the 
irrigation of 1,051.5 acres. DMADC also argues that Vincent's use of the tail water was 
not a beneficial one and such water is therefore subject to forfeiture. DMADC implies 
that irrigation necessarily means cultivation, as if the only permissible irrigation is for 
cultivated crops. 
Utah law does not limit the definition of beneficial use of an irrigation water right 
to the application of water to cultivated acreage. This Court, for example, has upheld a 
8 Although the district court considered and rejected DMADC s untimely arguments, its 
decision is further supported by the fact that DMADC failed to provide any valid 
justification to support its motions to supplement and for reconsideration. 
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trial court's determination that irrigation water applied to natural vegetation which 
"satisfied aesthetic desires, encouraged indigenous plants to proliferate, reduced fire 
hazard, and created property line buffers" was a beneficial use of water sufficient to 
overcome a claim of forfeiture. In re General Determination of the Rights to Use All of 
Water, Both Surface and Underground, Within the Drainage Area of Utah Lake and 
Jordan River, 2004 UT 67, <H 36-37, 53-54, 98 P.3d 1. The Court noted that 
"consideration of the ends to which the irrigation has been applied is particularly 
relevant" and gave the example of cultivation of vegetation for grazing. Id., f 55, 98 P.3d 
1. See also In re Escalante Valley Drainage Area, 355 P.2d 64, 66 (Utah 1960). 
Here, Vincent's use of water to irrigate areas of natural vegetation goes well 
beyond the beneficial use recognized by the Court to satisfy aesthetic desires, reduce fire 
hazard, and create property line buffers. Vincent deliberately diverts water to specific 
areas on its property to proliferate the growth of vegetation necessary for winter cattle 
grazing and to support its commercial bird operation. To be clear, Vincent is not simply 
growing natural vegetation or bird habitat to encourage the hunting of wild birds that may 
or may not choose to nest on its land. Vincent runs a state-licensed bird hunting 
operation. Vincent purchases eggs and/or young chicks and pen raises the animals for its 
hunting operation. As hunters contract with Vincent for a bird hunting excursion, the 
birds are planted in specific hunting areas. 
A successful hunt requires dense vegetation where the birds can hide and where 
dogs can be used to flush the birds. The vegetation naturally occurring on the dry range 
land does not provide sufficient cover for the desired hunting experience. Hunters 
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contract with Vincent—rather than hunt on the open range—in part because Vincent 
provides better habitat areas. After the hunting season ends, Vincent puts its cattle into 
the vegetated areas to graze reducing the need to purchase winter feed. These facts were 
undisputed and, as the district court held, Vincent's use of water to support these ventures 
clearly constitutes a beneficial use. 
Contrary to DMADC's suggestion, Vincent's position on these matters did not 
change. Vincent has consistently represented that it irrigates up 1,051.5 acres when it 
can. Vincent can typically assume that it will be able to irrigate approximately 900 acres 
each year to a full irrigation duty and has cultivated that acreage. It uses additional water, 
to the extent it becomes available, to irrigate the remaining 150 acres allowed by the 
water right. DMADC's continued claim that Vincent cultivated 837 acres and could not 
have irrigated more is based on its unsupportable contention that irrigation water may 
only be applied to cultivated acreage. 
Moreover, DMADC's argument fails even if its acreage calculation were correct. 
There was no dispute that Vincent used the water available to it in the relevant years to 
irrigate at least 837 acres of cultivated land. It was also undisputed that the source failed 
to supply sufficient water and that Vincent beneficially used the remainder to support its 
bird hunting business and encourage growth of winter feed for its cattle. Regardless of 
the number of cultivated acres Vincent was able to fully irrigate in any given year, 
Vincent used the water made available to it.9 Additionally, the failure of the river to yield 
9 It may not be coincidental that DMADC's calculation that Vincent irrigates 79.6% of 
the land that is the basis for Vincent's water right (873/1,051.5) closely reflects the 
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Vincent's full water right was dispositive. As a result, the district court was not required 
to resolve DMADC's claimed dispute regarding the acreage cultivated by Vincent. 
ii. The District Court did not Shorten the Irrigation Season. 
DMADC further claims that in making its determination the district court 
mistakenly failed to consider the availability of pre-irrigation season water, and that the 
division of the irrigation season is at odds with the Cox Decree. The Cox Decree, 
however, clearly distinguishes between the two periods of water use {see R. at 13-14), 
and DMADC's argument, though untimely, was considered by the district court. As 
Vincent argued to the district court, DMADC's focus on water available between 
March 1 and April 15 of each year was not based on new evidence. The district court 
already had all of the evidence regarding the availability of irrigation water prior to 
April 15 before it when it decided the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. 
The evidence showed that water available to Vincent prior to April 15 could be 
diverted, assuming it could be put to beneficial use before the growing season, up to the 
limit of Vincent's water right (22.0 cfs). However, there is no storage right associated 
with this pre-irrigation season flow. If Vincent cannot beneficially use the water 
available in March and early April that water is lost to it. Conversely, if Vincent is able 
to divert and beneficially use pre-irrigation season water, its use is not deducted from 
Vincent's right to divert water during the irrigation season by the river commissioner. 
72.2% 30-year average yield of the Sevier River, as calculated based on records 
maintained by the river commissioner. (R. at 206.) If anything, those figures indicate 
that Vincent has been slightly more efficient in its farming operations than would be 
anticipated based on its proportion of the river flows. 
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Thus, as of April 16, Vincent's right remains the right to divert up to 22.0 cfs from the 
Sevier River for the irrigation of 1,051.5 acres of land with 5,000 acre feet of water, 
regardless of whether or not it was able to beneficially use water between March 1 and 
April 15. Because the pre-irrigation season water cannot be stored or counted as a credit 
for later delivery of water, Vincent cannot plan for the cultivation of its fields based upon 
the availability of water from March 1 to April 15. Vincent must plan its land use and 
crop cultivation based upon the water that it can reasonably expect to receive during the 
growing season, typically after April 15. 
Very few water users on the lower Sevier River can make beneficial use of pre-
irrigation season water. There is generally little water available in the river because the 
runoff season has not yet begun. And, in most years, the ditches cannot convey and 
ground in the area cannot reasonably take irrigation water from March 1 to April 15 
because the ditches are iced-over or the ground is still too wet from the winter 
precipitation. Irrigating wet fields too early in the season can also damage crops. 
DMADC's argument would require Vincent to run this early water to waste simply to 
protect it from forfeiture, in contravention of DMADC's own cautions against wasting 
water in this arid state. 
The district court correctly observed that it did not need to address either party's 
concerns about the early season water. (R. at 686.) Even considering "the combined 
total of early water and water made available during the irrigation season," the water 
supplied by the Sevier River was "insufficient to meet [Vincent's] annual allotment for at 
least one out of each five year period between 1999 and 2008." (R. at 868.) The court's 
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ruling was based on the undisputed evidence before it, including DMADC's records {see 
R. at 686), and affidavits submitted by the Sevier River Commissioner on behalf of both 
parties (see R. at 492-561, 587-90). Further, DMADC based its argument, as explained 
below, on incorrect assumptions about the duty associated with Vincent's water right. 
The district court did not disturb its original summary judgment ruling because Vincent's 
water right was still exempt from forfeiture. (R. at 686-87.) 
iii. The Measure of Vincent's Water Right is 5,000 Acre Feet. 
Finally, DMADC takes issue with the district court's holding that the "duty" 
associated with Vincent's water right is 5,000 acre feet. DMADC asked the district court 
to take judicial notice of a page of the Utah State Engineer's website, which lists the 
generally duty for that geographical area as four acre feet of water per acre of land. (R. at 
248.) DMADC makes this argument as if a "duty" figure administratively set by a state 
agency somehow amends or limits the scope of a water right established and confirmed 
by the district court in a general adjudication. Neither the legislature nor the courts have 
accorded the Utah State Engineer the power to accomplish such a taking. Leaving aside 
the district court's evidentiary concern about the State Engineer's own disclaimer about 
the reliability of the information on its own website (R. at 685), the concept of "duty" is 
nowhere defined or applied in the statutes governing Utah water rights. "Duty" may be a 
useful administrative tool for the State Engineer to use in the discharge of his statutory 
functions,10 but it is not a concept that administratively diminishes or limits rights 
10 Counsel for Vincent acknowledged at argument that the State Engineer often 
references a 4 acre foot per acre duty when it administratively evaluates water 
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established by courts of competent jurisdiction, particularly when those courts issue 
decrees at the conclusion of a laborious general adjudication process. 
Vincent demonstrated that its predecessor-in-interest was awarded a water right 
based on a flow of up to 22 cubic feet per second by the 1936 Cox Decree. That right, in 
turn, had previously been quantified in the Proposed Determination as the right to receive 
5,000 acre feet to complete the irrigation of 1,051.5 acres of land. (R. at 173-4, 365.) As 
noted by DMADC itself in its opening brief, once any objections to a proposed 
determination have been resolved, "'the district must enter judgment rendering the [PD] 
the final adjudication of the water rights for the given area."' (DMADC Br. at 11 
(quoting Green River Canal Co. v. Olds, 2004 UT 106,17,110 P.3d 666).) That 
occurred in connection with the Cox Decree and the Decree, and the Proposed 
Determination which it confirmed, were the final adjudication of the water right now 
owned by Vincent. Significantly, DMADC did not appeal that decision, nor has it ever 
attempted to reopen the general adjudication in order to amend the Cox Decree. 
DMADC subsequently moved for reconsideration, and the district court 
recognized that it had "failed to acknowledge the apparent issue of fact" related to the 
"amount of acre feet of water [Vincent] is entitled to receive." (R. at 685.) Reevaluating 
the parties' positions on the duty issue, the district court rejected DMADC s claim that 
the Vincent water right had been diminished by an administratively established "duty" set 
applications in Juab County but, contrary to the reference at page xx of DMADC s brief, 
counsel did not concede that administrative duty applied to or limited Vincent's water 
right as established by the Cox Decree. Indeed, Vincent contested DMADC s duty 
argument. (R. at 356, 685-86.) 
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forth on a website, especially since the website on which DMADC relied expressly states 
that the information provided therein is "for general reference only and may not 
accurately represent the correct duty value in certain locations." (R. at 685.) DMADC 
provided no other support for its position. 
By contrast, the Proposed Determination expressly allocates 5,000 acre feet to 
Water Right No. 68-3002. (R. at 16.) That determination carries the force of law. In 
order to address that figure in terms argued by DMADC, the district court equated it to a 
duty of approximately 5 acre feet per acre (5,000 acre feet -r 1,051.5 acres). DMADC 
objects to the district court's reliance on the Proposed Determination, saying that the 
Proposed Determination may have proposed awarding Vincent's predecessor 5,000 acre 
feet of water "but the Cox Decreed did not award this amount." (DMADC Br. at xx.) 
This argument is nonsensical, especially in light of DMADC's later acknowledgements 
that that the decree renders the Proposed Determination the final adjudication, and that a 
"[f]ailure to protest a PD bars further challenge." (DMADC Br. at 11 (citing In re 
General Determination of the Rights to Use All of Water, Both Surface and 
Underground, Within the Drainage Area of Utah Lake and Jordan River, 2004 UT 67, 
^22,98P.3dl) .) 
As noted, a proposed determination is prepared by the State Engineer for the court 
to consider in ruling on a general adjudication. See, e.g., U.S. Fuel Co. v. Huntington-
Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2003 UT 49, f 14, 79 P.3d 945. A court "must render 
judgment in accordance with a proposed determination where the proposed determination 
is uncontested." Id. f 15, 79 P.3d 945. In issuing the Cox Decree, the court there noted 
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its reliance on "the State Engineer of the State of Utah having made and filed herewith 
his proposed determination of the rights in the use of the water of said Sevier River 
System, as provided by the law." (R. at 166, 255.) The court, having "heard and 
determined all objections filed to said proposed determination" (R. at 166, 255), entered 
the Cox Decree and did not alter the number of acres or the amount of water associated 
with Vincent's water right (see R. at 166-70, 255-60). Neither was subsequently 
modified by the district court. (R. at 686.) 
Both before the district court and on appeal, DMADC relied on the Proposed 
Determination in advancing other arguments. It now claims, however, that reliance by 
the district court on that same document for the measure of the Vincent water rights is 
improper. There is no factual or legal basis for DMADC s position. The district court 
properly relied on the Proposed Determination and Cox Decree, which was the 
uncontro verted evidence before the court and showed that the amount of water awarded 
to Vincent's predecessor-in-interest was 5,000 acre feet for use on 1,051.5 acres, or an 
approximate "duty," in DMADC s vernacular, of about 5 acre feet per acre. 
II. UTAH LAW DID NOT PROVIDE FOR PARTIAL FORFEITURE PRIOR 
TO 2002 
DMADC also argues that the district court erred by failing to consider the alleged 
nonuse of water by Vincent's predecessor, Mclntyre, and by failing to apply "the 
forfeiture test established by this Court" in Rocky Ford Irrigation Co. v. Rents Lake 
Reservoir Co., 135 P.2d 108 (Utah 1943). (DMADC Br. at xi-xii.) DMADC claims that 
in deciding Rocky Ford, the Court expressly adopted partial forfeiture as a part of Utah 
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law, and that the Court's discussion of partial forfeiture "is not dicta." (DMADC Br. at 
7.) In making this argument, DMADC either misreads or ignores the caselaw. 
A. Partial Forfeiture Was Not the Law in Utah until it was Enacted by the 
Legislature in 2002. 
The district court accommodated DMADC s request on reconsideration, 
reexamined the record, and expressly found that there was not sufficient water in the 
Sevier River in the years prior to 2002 to satisfy the Vincent water right, concluding that 
the water right would therefore not have been susceptible to forfeiture if Utah had 
recognized partial forfeiture during that period. (R. at 735, 738.) DMADC correctly 
recognizes that this was an alternative holding. The district court's primary holding was 
that the 2002 amendment to section 73-1-4 established for the first time in Utah law the 
possibility that a portion of a water right could be forfeited. (The common understanding 
before that time was that the use of any portion of a water right preserved the whole.) 
The district court determined that the 2002 amendment was substantive and thus could 
not be applied to periods before its enactment because the legislature gave no indication 
that the amendment was intended to have retroactive effect. (R. at 416.) See Olsen v. 
Samuel Mclntyre Inv. Co., 956 P.2d 257, 261 (Utah 1998). It was the creation of new, 
substantive law that cannot apply to periods prior to 2002. See Harvey v. Cedar Hills 
City, 2010 UT 12, ffl 12-13, 227 P.3d 256. 
DMADC claims instead that Rocky Ford established partial forfeiture prior to the 
statute's 2002 amendment. In Rocky Ford, the plaintiff opposed a change application 
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filed by the defendant, contending that the defendant forfeited a portion of its water right 
by failing to use it over a five year period. Id, at 111. The State Engineer and lower 
court both approved the defendant's change application. Id, at 110. On appeal, this 
Court held that the defendant's water right was not subject to forfeiture because it had 
made use of all of the water available to it in one out of the five years of nonuse claimed 
by the plaintiff. Id, at 113. Evaluating the parties' competing evidence, the Court stated 
"if there were a five year continuous period during which [the defendant] failed to use 
material amounts of available water, we should hold that a forfeiture of at least part of its 
right has occurred by virtue of this nonuse." Id. at 112. The Court determined that it did 
not need to decide that question, however, because the defendant's use of all water 
available to it in the relevant time period precluded forfeiture. Id, at 112-13. The Court's 
statement that it "should" make a particular holding was expressly conditional, and could 
be read to depend in a variety of ways, including the supposition that partial forfeiture 
ought to be the law in Utah but was not. The Court's supposition about partial forfeiture 
was clearly not the holding of the case, and it neither established nor confirmed partial 
forfeiture as a feature of Utah law. 
Vincent's reading of Rocky Ford is consistent with this Court's subsequent 
observation that the question of partial forfeiture "has never been directly before this 
Court." Eskelsen v. Town of Perry, 819 P.2d 770, 774 n.9 (Utah 1991). Expressly citing 
Rocky Ford (the case DMADC claims had settled the issue), the Court stated: 
The question of partial forfeiture is not addressed in our statutes and has 
never been directly before this court . . . . A 1943 case did, however, 
intimate—without squarely deciding—that partial forfeiture is possible. 
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See Rocky Ford Irr. Co. v. Rents Lake Reservoir Co., 104 Utah 202, 135 
P.2d 108, 112(1943). 
Id. (emphasis added). Contrary to DMADC's argument, the language regarding partial 
forfeiture in Rocky Ford was not a holding but rather an acknowledgement by the court 
of an argument it did not need to reach. In 2004, the Court repeated that it has "never 
expressly adopted the principle of partial forfeiture of water rights." In re General 
Determination of the Rights to Use All of Water, Both Surface and Underground, Within 
the Drainage Area of Utah Lake and Jordan River, 2004 UT 67, <j[ 56 n.7, 98 P.3d 1 
(emphasis added). 
Perhaps because these cases undermine DMADC's argument, DMADC fails to 
cite them. Vincent suggests it is significant (though certainly not controlling) that the 
Eskelsen Court noted without criticism the trial court's holding that partial forfeiture does 
not apply in the state of Utah. Eskelsen, 819 P.2d at 774 n.9. The Court did not need to 
reach that issue in Eskelsen because, as here, the facts did not support partial forfeiture. 
Id. 
Although partial forfeiture was not then a part of Utah law, the Court in Eskelsen 
recognized that policy considerations might support enactment of partial forfeiture and, 
essentially, invited the Utah Legislature to review the issue. Discussing the trial court's 
holding that partial forfeiture does not apply in the state of Utah, the Court continued 
Such a result would mean that the use of any part of a water right, no matter 
how small, would preserve the whole. As a matter of public policy, it 
might be prudent to allow partial forfeiture; all of the policy reasons that 
support forfeiture as a general principle would be furthered by, and 
hindered without, partial forfeiture. 
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Id. (emphasis added). In 2002, the Utah Legislature accepted the Court's invitation and, 
based at least in part on the policy considerations identified, enacted the partial forfeiture 
provision. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-4 (2002). Nothing in the statute indicates, and no 
party has argued, that this amendment was intended to have retroactive effect. 
Because there was no statute or reported decision in this arid state expressly 
providing for partial forfeiture in the more than 150 years before the 2002 enactment, 
DMADC and the State Engineer are forced to argue that such a doctrine was inherently 
or impliedly part of the law. DMADC suggests that a plain reading of Utah Code 
Annotated section 73-1-3 is all that is required to reverse, though no court had ever 
reached that conclusion. DMADC and the State Engineer focus largely on beneficial use, 
which Vincent freely acknowledges is the basis, measure, and limit of a water right. But 
that general principle of water law does not trump the specific facts of this case. Their 
arguments ignore the fact that Vincent owns a water right the parameters of which were 
established by judicial decree issued following a general adjudication, a decree that has 
never been limited or amended by the court. Their arguments ignore the undisputed fact 
that the Sevier River has delivered the full amount of decreed water only three times in 
the past thirty years and, particularly, ignore the fact that Vincent has consistently put to 
beneficial use substantially all of the water made available to it. 
The State Engineer claims that without partial forfeiture, a water user could 
preserve a water right in its entirety by using only 2% of the right for 100 years. (State 
Engineer Br. at 8.) But those numbers do not even approach the facts of this case. 
Indeed, the State Engineer acknowledges in one sentence of its brief, but without further 
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comment, the basis for the district court's holding here, "[t]his Court has held that 
forfeiture does not occur when nature does not provide sufficient water for use under the 
water right." (State Engineer Br. at 14 (citing Rocky Ford Irrigation Co. v. Rents Lake 
Reservoir Co., 135 P.2d 108, 113 (Utah 1943)).) The State Engineer is also afraid that a 
water user who ceases to use its full water right could resume full use in the future and 
somehow reap a windfall. (State Engineer Br. at 11.) This imagined evil is not remotely 
present here. The State Engineer's arguments appear to be based on DMADC's 
unsupported argument that Vincent did not use substantial portions of its water right. 
The undisputed facts before the court demonstrated otherwise. 
The State Engineer frankly does not appear to understand that he has no role in 
forfeiture matters, even though this Court has on occasion felt constrained to remind him 
of that fact. Forfeiture is always, and exclusively, a function for the judiciary. See 
Jensen v. Jones, 2011 UT 67, fR 10-13, 270 P.3d 425. The State Engineer lacks any 
authority to adjudicate water rights, including forfeiture issues. Id., 270 P.3d 425. The 
State Engineer, an executive officer, is incorrect when he argues that partial forfeiture 
powers are granted to him under the general adjudication statute, and that he needs to 
determine partial forfeiture in order to evaluate water use and issue proposed 
determinations. (State Engineer Br. at 14-17.) 
The State Engineer is charged by the general adjudication statute with the 
responsibility of assisting the court by investigating and mapping diversion points, 
conveyance systems, and places of use for each water right. In that process and in 
completing a proposed determination, the State Engineer is clearly required to consider 
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the extent to which water rights are then being put to beneficial use. Beneficial use is the 
basic measure of all water rights adjudicated by the courts, but the State Engineer's role 
in that process is to complete a "survey" of the use of the water rights in the drainage, 
provide notice and an opportunity for comment, and then formulate a report and proposed 
determination for the court. Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-4-3 through 73-4-11 (2012). This is 
an important responsibility for which the State Engineer is well qualified. He acts like a 
statutorily appointed special master to assist the court: he completes his administrative 
functions as described by statute, and then publishes and files a proposed determination. 
Contrary to the arguments of DMADC and the State Engineer, it is the court that 
makes judicial determinations regarding the priority and use of water. See U.S. Fuel Co. 
v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2003 UT 49, f 14, 79 P.3d 945. In making a 
proposed determination, the State Engineer is not ruling on forfeiture of water rights. 
Rather, the State Engineer investigates and reports on the current beneficial use of the 
various claimants. See id., 79 P.3d 945. The State Engineer has no power to strip a water 
right from its owner, either fully or partially. See id., 79 P.3d 945. Courts alone have the 
power to determine water rights and "are under no obligation to defer to" the State 
Engineer's findings. See id., 79 P.3d945. 
Vincent's water right stands until a court determines otherwise. It was established 
in the Cox Decree. The general adjudication statutes provide that, once the right to use of 
water "has been decreed or adjudicated" by the court, the State Engineer "shall 
distribute" water "in accordance with the decree until the decree is reversed, modified, 
vacated, or otherwise legally set aside." Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-11(3) (2012). The Cox 
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Decree, as DMADC admits, has not been reversed or altered. (DMADC Br. at 20.) The 
role of the State Engineer with regard to this, and other, decreed rights, is to distribute 
water according to the decree. The doctrine of partial forfeiture is neither an express nor 
an ancillary part of that function. 
DMADC describes a condition for Vincent that applies throughout the Sevier 
River drainage; i.e., there is less water available than was originally decreed. DMADC 
and a host of others are affected by that chronic situation in the same way as is Vincent. 
Should DMADC desire a redistribution of the lifeblood of this part of the desert, 
DMADC's remedy is not to try to strip increments of water from individual farms that 
are equally affected by the shortages. See In re General Determination of Rights to the 
Use of Water, 2004 UT 106, 1j 5, 110 P.3d 666 (observing that the purpose of a general 
adjudication process is to prevent piecemeal litigation). (See also DMADC Br. at 11 n.20 
(recognizing that the proper procedure is a general adjudication to avoid piecemeal 
litigation).) DMADC's remedy is instead to petition the courts to re-adjudicate the river. 
The State Engineer would then be empowered to investigate the current, actual beneficial 
use of all of the waters currently being diverted from the Sevier River and make its 
recommendation to a court. The court may then replace or amend the Cox Decree in a 
manner that is equitable to those who depend on the waters of the Sevier River for their 
livelihood. In the meantime, the Cox Decree, and the Proposed Determination on which 
it was based, remain the law of the land. 
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B, Mclntyre Did Not Receive Its Full Water Right and Used All Water 
Available to It* 
Even if the partial forfeiture amendment found in Utah Code Annotated section 
73-1-4 had application to periods prior to 2002, DMADC's claim fails because Vincent 
and its predecessor used all of the water available to them. Vincent, as discussed, used 
substantially all of the water available to it between 1998 when it acquired the property 
and 2002. Any material nonuse of Water Right No. 68-3002 by Vincent was due solely 
to the failure of the Sevier River to provide the full allocation of the water right. The 
records of the Sevier River Commissioner show that Mclntyre similarly did not receive 
its full allocation of water under Water Right 68-3002. See Rocky Ford Irrigation Co. v. 
Kents Lake Reservoir Co., 135 P.2d 108, 111 (Utah 1943) ("[T]he courts have uniformly 
held that forfeiture will not operate in those cases where the failure to use is the result of 
physical causes beyond the control of the appropriator such as . . . draughts, etc., where 
the appropriator is ready and willing to diver the water when it is naturally available."). 
The only year relevant to this claim in which Mclntyre may have received the full 
5000 acre-foot allocation was 1988. (R. at 206.) Each and every year thereafter, up until 
the date Vincent purchased the ranch in 1998, Mclntyre did not receive its full allocation 
of water in any subsequent year. In most years, the water made available to Mclntyre 
was more than 600 acre-feet short of the allocation and in some years it was more than 
1,000 acre-feet short of the decreed right. (See R. at 206, 366, 368-82.) Even so, 
DMADC's own declarant testified that Mclntyre used all of the water it could and that 
they never received more water than could be used on the cultivated acres. (R. at 344.) 
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The evidence similarly established that Vincent, prior to 2002, used all of the water made 
available to it by the Sevier River. 
III. DMADC's ABANDOMENT CLAIM WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED 
DMADC's remaining argument is that the district court improperly dismissed its 
abandonment claim. DMADC sought declarations of both forfeiture and abandonment of 
Vincent's water right pursuant to section 73-1-4. (R. at 7.) DMADC, in effect, invited 
the district court to evaluate its claim for abandonment under the same statutory scheme 
that applies to forfeiture. (R. at 7, 736-37.) The court did so and because DMADC failed 
to establish the necessary factors for forfeiture under that statute, the district court 
correctly dismissed the abandonment claim premised on the same statute. 
As DMADC explains, abandonment requires proof of the water user's intent to 
abandon the water right. (DMADC Br. at 26.) Vincent asked for summary judgment on 
the abandonment claim because it was based on the same facts DMADC offered to 
support its forfeiture claim. In response, DMADC presented no evidence of Vincent's 
supposed intent to abandon its water right. While intent of abandonment may be implied 
in some circumstances (see DMADC Br. at 26), intent could not be implied here because 
DMADC failed to show that Vincent did not use the water made available to it.11 
11 DMADC's complaint that the district court failed to rule on its abandonment claim is 
also undermined by DMADC's approval of the May 7, 2012 Final Order and Judgment. 
By approving the form of the judgment, DMADC confirmed "the parties' agreement, as 
evidenced by their approval of this Order, that there are no issues remaining for trial and 
thus no reason to delay entry of a final judgment herein." (R. at 753.) 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor 
of Vincent should be affirmed in each of its particulars. 
Dated this 9th day of January 2013. 
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U.C.A. 1953 §73-1-4 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 73. WATER AND IRRIGATION 
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Copyright (c) 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
Current through the 2002 5th Special Session 
73-1-4 Reversion to the public by abandonment or forfeiture for nonuse within five years —Extension of time. 
(1) In order to further the state policy of securing the maximum use and benefit of its scarce water resources, a 
person entitled to the use of water has a continuing obligation to place all of a water right to beneficial use. The for-
feiture of all or part of any right to use water for failure to place all or part of the water to beneficial use makes possible 
the allocation and use of water consistent with long established beneficial use concepts. The provisions of Subsections 
(2) through (6) shall be construed to carry out the purposes and policies set forth in this Subsection (1). 
(2) As used in this section, "public water supply entity" means an entity that supplies water as a utility service or for 
irrigation purposes and is also: 
(a) a municipality, water conservancy district, metropolitan water district, irrigation district created under Section 
17A-2-7, or other public agency; 
(b) a water company regulated by the Public Service Commission; or 
(c) any other owner of a community water system. 
(3) (a) When an appropriator or the appropriator's successor in interest abandons or ceases to use all or a portion of a 
water right for a period of five years, the water right or the unused portion of that water right ceases and the water 
reverts to the public, unless, before the expiration of the five-year period, the appropriator or the appropriator's 
successor in interest files a verified nonuse application with the state engineer. 
(b) (i) A nonuse application may be filed on all or a portion of the water right, including water rights held by mutual 
irrigation companies, 
(ii) Public water supply entities that own stock in a mutual water company, after giving written notice to the water 
company, may file nonuse applications with the state engineer on the water represented by the stock. 
(c) (i) A water right or a portion of the water right may not be forfeited unless a judicial action to declare the right 
forfeited is commenced within 15 years from the end of the latest period of nonuse of at least five years, 
(ii) If forfeiture is asserted in an action for general determination of rights in conformance with the provisions of 
Chapter 4, Determination of Water Rights, the 15-year limitation period shall commence to run back in time from 
the date the state engineer's proposed determination of rights is served upon each claimant, 
(iii) A decree entered in an action for general determination of rights under Chapter 4, Determination of Water Rights, 
shall bar any claim of forfeiture for prior nonuse against any right determined to be valid in the decree, but shall 
not bar a claim for periods of nonuse that occur after the entry of the decree, 
(iv) A proposed determination by the state engineer in an action for general determination of rights under Chapter 4, 
Determination of Water Rights, shall bar any claim of forfeiture for prior nonuse against any right proposed to be 
valid, unless a timely objection has been filed within the time allowed in Chapter 4, Determination of Water 
Rights. 
(d) The extension of time to resume the use of that water may not exceed five years unless the time is further extended 
by the state engineer. 
(e) The provisions of this section are applicable whether the unused or abandoned water or a portion of the water is 
permitted to run to waste or is used by others without right with the knowledge of the water right holder, provided 
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that the use of water pursuant to a lease or other agreement with the appropriator or the appropriated successor shall 
be considered to constitute beneficial use. 
(f) The provisions of this section shall not apply: 
(i) to those periods of time when a surface water source fails to yield sufficient water to satisfy the water right, or when 
groundwater is not available because of a sustained drought; 
(ii) to water stored in reservoirs pursuant to an existing water right, where the stored water is being held in storage for 
present or future use; or 
(iii) when a water user has beneficially used substantially all of a water right within a five-year period, provided that 
this exemption shall not apply to the adjudication of a water right in a general determination of water rights under 
Chapter 4, Determination of Water Rights. 
(g) Groundwater rights used to supplement the quantity or quality of other water supplies may not be subject to loss or 
reduction under this section if not used during periods when the other water source delivers sufficient water so as to 
not require use of the supplemental groundwater. 
(4) (a) The state engineer shall furnish an application requiring the following information: 
(i) the name and address of the applicant; 
(ii) a description of the water right or a portion of the water right, including the point of diversion, place of use, and 
priority; 
(iii) the date the water was last diverted and placed to beneficial use; 
(iv) the quantity of water; 
(v) the period of use; 
(vi) the extension of time applied for; 
(vii) a statement of the reason for the nonuse of the water; and 
(viii) any other information that the state engineer requires. 
(b) Filing the application extends the time during which nonuse may continue until the state engineer issues his order 
on the nonuse application, 
(c) (i) Upon receipt of the application, the state engineer shall publish, once a week for two successive weeks, a notice of 
the application in a newspaper of general circulation in the county in which the source of the water supply is 
located and where the water is to be used, 
(ii) The notice shall inform the public of the nature of the right for which the extension is requested and the reasons for 
the extension. 
(d) Any interested person may file a written protest with the state engineer against the granting of the application: 
(i) within 20 days after the notice is published, if the adjudicative proceeding is informal; and 
(ii) within 30 days after the notice is published, if the adjudicative proceeding is formal. 
(e) In any proceedings to determine whether the application for extension should be approved or rejected, the state 
engineer shall follow the procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act. 
(f) After further investigation, the state engineer may approve or reject the application. 
(5) (a) Nonuse applications on all or a portion of a water right shall be granted by the state engineer for periods not 
exceeding five years each, upon a showing of reasonable cause for nonuse. 
(b) Reasonable causes for nonuse include: 
(i) demonstrable financial hardship or economic depression; 
(ii) the initiation of recognized water conservation or efficiency practices, or the operation of a groundwater recharge 
recovery program approved by the state engineer; 
(iii) operation of legal proceedings; 
(iv) the holding of a water right or stock in a mutual water company without use by any public water supply entity to 
meet the reasonable future requirements of the public; 
(v) situations where, in the opinion of the state engineer, the nonuse would assist in implementing an existing, ap-
proved water management plan; 
(vi) situations where all or part of the land on which water is used is contracted under an approved state agreement or 
federal conservation fallowing program; 
(vii) the loss of capacity caused by deterioration of the water supply or delivery equipment if the applicant submits, 
with the application, a specific plan to resume full use of the water right by replacing, restoring, or improving the 
equipment; or 
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(viii) any other reasonable cause. 
(6) (a) Sixty days before the expiration of any extension of time, the state engineer shall notify the applicant by registered 
mail or by any form of electronic communication through which receipt is verifiable, of the date when the extension 
period will expire. 
(b) Before the date of expiration, the applicant shall either: 
(i) file a verified statement with the state engineer setting forth the date on which use of the water was resumed, and 
whatever additional information is required by the state engineer; or 
(ii) apply for a further extension of time in which to resume use of the water according to the procedures and re-
quirements of this section. 
(c) Upon receipt of the applicant's properly completed, verified statement, the state engineer shall conduct investiga-
tions necessary to verify that beneficial use has resumed and, if so, shall issue a certificate of resumption of use of 
the water as evidenced by the resumed beneficial use. 
(7) The appropriator's water right or a portion of the water right ceases and the water reverts to the public if the: 
(a) appropriator or the appropriator's successor in interest fails to apply for an extension of time; 
(b) state engineer denies the nonuse application; or 
(c) appropriator or the appropriator's successor in interest fails to apply for a further extension of time. 
History: L. 1919, ch. 67, § 6;R.S. 1933, 100-1-4;L. 1935,ch. 104, § 1; 1939, ch. I l l , § 1;C. 1943, 100-1-4; L. 1945, 
ch. 134, § 1; 1959, ch. 137, § 1; 1987, ch. 161, § 287; 1988, ch. 72, § 28; 1995, ch. 19, § 1; 1996, ch. 98, § 1; 2001, ch. 
136, § l;2002,ch.20, § 1. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Amendment Notes. —The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, redesignated the second sentence of Subsec-
tion (l)(b) as (l)(c); subdivided Subsection (2)(c); substituted "two" for "three" before "successive weeks" and added 
"and where water is to be used" in Subsection (2)(c)(i); added Subsections (2)(c)(ii), (2)(d)(i), and (2)(d)(ii); and made 
related and stylistic changes throughout. 
The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 1996, in Subsection (l)(a), substituted "water right ceases and the water 
reverts to the public" for "the right ceases"; added Subsection (l)(b), and redesignated subsequent subsections ac-
cordingly; redesignated former Subsection (5) as Subsection (4) and former Subsection (4) as Subsection (5); added 
Subsection (5)(a)(iii); and made stylistic changes throughout the section. 
The 2001 amendment, effective April 30, 2001, in Subsection (4)(a) added "or by any form of electronic commu-
nication through which receipt is verifiable," in Subsection (4)(b)(i) added "in a manner prescribed by the state en-
gineer," and made stylistic changes. 
The 2002 amendment, effective May 6, 2002, rewrote this section. 
Compiler's Notes. —This section was Comp. Laws 1907, § 1288x23. 
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U.C.A. 1953 §73-1-4 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 73. Water and Irrigation 
Chapter 1. General Provisions 
§ 73-1-4. Reversion to the publie by abandonment or forfeiture for nonuse within five years—Extension of 
time 
(l)(a) In order to further the state policy of securing the maximum use and benefit of its scarce water resources, a 
person entitled to the use of water has a continuing obligation to place all of a water right to beneficial use. 
(b) The forfeiture of all or part of any right to use water for failure to place all or part of the water to beneficial use 
makes possible the allocation and use of water consistent with long established beneficial use concepts. 
(c) The provisions of Subsections (2) through (6) shall be construed to carry out the purposes and policies set forth in 
this Subsection (1). 
(2) As used in this section, "public water supply entity" means an entity that supplies water as a utility service or for 
irrigation purposes and is also: 
(a) a municipality, water conservancy district, metropolitan water district, irrigation district, or other public agency; 
(b) a water company regulated by the Public Service Commission; or 
(c) any other owner of a community water system. 
(3)(a) When an appropriator or the appropriator's successor in interest abandons or ceases to use all or a portion of a 
water right for a period of five years, the water right or the unused portion of that water right ceases and the water 
reverts to the public, unless, before the expiration of the five-year period, the appropriator or the appropriator's suc-
cessor in interest files a verified nonuse application with the state engineer. 
(b)(i) A nonuse application may be filed on all or a portion of the water right, including water rights held by mutual 
irrigation companies, 
(ii) Public water supply entities that own stock in a mutual water company, after giving written notice to the water 
company, may file nonuse applications with the state engineer on the water represented by the stock. 
(c)(i) A water right or a portion of the water right may not be forfeited unless a judicial action to declare the right 
forfeited is commenced within 15 years from the end of the latest period of nonuse of at least five years, 
(ii) If forfeiture is asserted in an action for general determination of rights in conformance with the provisions of 
Chapter 4, Determination of Water Rights, the 15-year limitation period shall commence to run back in time from 
the date the state engineer's proposed determination of rights is served upon each claimant, 
(iii) A decree entered in an action for general determination of rights under Chapter 4, Determination of Water 
Rights, shall bar any claim of forfeiture for prior nonuse against any right determined to be valid in the decree, but 
shall not bar a claim for periods of nonuse that occur after the entry of the decree. 
(iv) A proposed determination by the state engineer in an action for general determination of rights under Chapter 4, 
Determination of Water Rights, shall bar any claim of forfeiture for prior nonuse against any right proposed to be 
valid, unless a timely objection has been filed within the time allowed in Chapter 4, Determination of Water Rights. 
(d) The extension of time to resume the use of that water may not exceed five years unless the time is further extended 
by the state engineer. 
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(e) The provisions of this section are applicable whether the unused or abandoned water or a portion of the water is 
permitted to run to waste or is used by others without right with the knowledge of the water right holder, provided that 
the use of water pursuant to a lease or other agreement with the appropriator or the appropriator's successor shall be 
considered to constitute beneficial use. 
(f) The provisions of this section shall not apply: 
(i) to those periods of time when a surface water source fails to yield sufficient water to satisfy the water right, or 
when groundwater is not available because of a sustained drought; 
(ii) to water stored in reservoirs pursuant to an existing water right, where the stored water is being held in storage 
for present or future use; or 
(iii) when a water user has beneficially used substantially all of a water right within a five-year period, provided that 
this exemption shall not apply to the adjudication of a water right in a general determination of water rights under 
Chapter 4, Determination of Water Rights. 
(g) Groundwater rights used to supplement the quantity or quality of other water supplies may not be subject to loss or 
reduction under this section if not used during periods when the other water source delivers sufficient water so as to 
not require use of the supplemental groundwater. 
(4)(a) The state engineer shall furnish an application requiring the following information: 
(i) the name and address of the applicant; 
(ii) a description of the water right or a portion of the water right, including the point of diversion, place of use, and 
priority; 
(iii) the date the water was last diverted and placed to beneficial use; 
(iv) the quantity of water; 
(v) the period of use; 
(vi) the extension of time applied for; 
(vii) a statement of the reason for the nonuse of the water; and 
(viii) any other information that the state engineer requires, 
(b) Filing the application extends the time during which nonuse may continue until the state engineer issues his order 
on the nonuse application. 
(c)(i) Upon receipt of the application, the state engineer shall publish a notice of the application once a week for two 
successive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the county in which the source of the water supply is located 
and where the water is to be used. 
(ii) The notice shall: 
(A) state that an application has been made; and 
(B) specify where the interested party may obtain additional information relating to the application. 
(d) Any interested person may file a written protest with the state engineer against the granting of the application: 
(i) within 20 days after the notice is published, if the adjudicative proceeding is informal; and 
(ii) within 30 days after the notice is published, if the adjudicative proceeding is formal. 
(e) In any proceedings to determine whether the application for extension should be approved or rejected, the state 
engineer shall follow the procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act. 
(f) After further investigation, the state engineer may approve or reject the application. 
(5)(a) Nonuse applications on all or a portion of a water right shall be granted by the state engineer for periods not 
exceeding five years each, upon a showing of reasonable cause for nonuse. 
(b) Reasonable causes for nonuse include: 
(i) demonstrable financial hardship or economic depression; 
(ii) the initiation of recognized water conservation or efficiency practices, or the operation of a groundwater re-
charge recovery program approved by the state engineer; 
(iii) operation of legal proceedings; 
(iv) the holding of a water right or stock in a mutual water company without use by any public water supply entity to 
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meet the reasonable future requirements of the public; 
(v) situations where, in the opinion of the state engineer, the nonuse would assist in implementing an existing, ap-
proved water management plan; 
(vi) situations where all or part of the land on which water is used is contracted under an approved state agreement or 
federal conservation fallowing program; 
(vii) the loss of capacity caused by deterioration of the water supply or delivery equipment if the applicant submits, 
with the application, a specific plan to resume full use of the water right by replacing, restoring, or improving the 
equipment; or 
(viii) any other reasonable cause. 
(6)(a) Sixty days before the expiration of any extension of time, the state engineer shall notify the applicant by mail or 
by any form of electronic communication through which receipt is verifiable, of the date when the extension period 
will expire. 
(b) Before the date of expiration, the applicant shall either: 
(i) file a verified statement with the state engineer setting forth the date on which use of the water was resumed, and 
whatever additional information is required by the state engineer; or 
(ii) apply for a further extension of time in which to resume use of the water according to the procedures and re-
quirements of this section. 
(c) Upon receipt of the applicant's properly completed, verified statement, the state engineer shall conduct investiga-
tions necessary to verify that beneficial use has resumed and, if so, shall issue a certificate of resumption of use of the 
water as evidenced by the resumed beneficial use. 
(7) The appropriator's water right or a portion of the water right ceases and the water reverts to the public if the: 
(a) appropriator or the appropriator's successor in interest fails to apply for an extension of time; 
(b) state engineer denies the nonuse application; or 
(c) appropriator or the appropriator's successor in interest fails to apply for a further extension of time. 
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>RIMARYAVE. 
Category: WATER 
PRIMARY AVE. 
1935—46.3% 
1936—50.7% 
1937—65.3% 
1938—65.3% 
1939—56.1% 
5 year ave.=56.7% 
1940—59.7% 
1941—72.8% 
1942—84.4% 
1943—67.1% 
1944—84.6% 
1945—85.6% 
1946—73.5% 
1947—79.0% 
1948—84.1%*** 
1949—76.0% 
10yearave.=76.7% 
1950—59.9% 
1951—57.0% 
1952—84.9% 
1953—69.9% 
1954—56.0% 
1955—51.6% 
1956—40.5% 
1957—61.4% 
1958—71.6% 
1959—46.7% 
10yearave.=60.0% 
1960—43.7% 
1961— 
1962—60.4% 
1963—41.1% 
1964—45.1% 
1965—63.3% 
1966—50.1% 
1967—46.7% 
1968—65.6% 
1969—85.1% 
9yearave.=55.7% 
1970—83% 
1971—74% 
1972—53% 
1973—82.4% 
1974—77% 
1975—79% 
1976—61% 
1977—42.1% 
1978—56% 
1979—70.1% 
10yearave.=67.8% 
1980—87% 
1981—77.9% 
1982—87.1% 
1983—100% 
1984—100% 
1985—96% 
1986—100% 
1987—80.3% 
1988—84% 
1989—69.9% 
10yearave.=88.2% 
1990—58.7% 
1991—62.1% 
1992—54.3% 
1993—68.6% 
1994—55.0% 
1995—79.7% 
1996—69.6% 
1997—82.9% 
1998—87.5% 
1999—83.7% 
10yearave.=70.2% 
2000—64.4% 
2001—62.7% 
2002—49.2% 
2003—50.1% 
2004—51.2% 
2005—68.7% 
2006—67.6% 
7yearave.=59.10% 
1935-1939 ave.=56.7% 
1940-1949 ave.=76.7% 
1950-1959 ave =60.0% 
1960-1969 ave.=55.7% 
1970-1979 ave =67.76% 
1980-1989 ave =88.2% 
1990-1999 ave.=70.2% 
30 year ave.=72.20%(1977-2006) 
71 year ave. =67.98%(1935-2006)-1961 no record 
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